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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's 
May 30, 2003 tentative finding that the Respondent Kirk S. DeMille is permanently 
and totally disabled. The Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction to hear this case is 
disputed; however, if this Court does have jurisdiction it arises pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-
2-801 (8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review this appeal? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law where appellate review is under 
a "correctness" standard with no deference to the agency's determination, because 
the appellate court has the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that 
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 
177, 182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
§63-46b-16(4)(d)(1988). 
Issue 2: Did the Utah Labor Commission correctly determine that Mr. DeMille 
has a "significant impairment under Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-413 (1997). 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law as it involves a matter of 
statutory interpretation. Appellate review is under a "correctness" standard with no 
deference to the agency's determination, because the appellate court has the power 
and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the 
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jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 177,182 (Utah 1997). Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). 
The Utah State Legislature has granted the Labor Commission "the full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law. . ." to any 
adjudicative proceeding before it. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). When "the 
governing statute makes an explicit grant of discretion to [an agency, the appellate 
court] appl[ies] a reasonableness and rationality standard, and may only overturn the 
[agency's] conclusions of law if they are unreasonable and irrational." Bernard v. 
Motor Vehicle Division. 905 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah App. 1995). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the 
Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 
1977). 
Issue 3: Did the Utah Labor Commission correctly determine that Mr. DeMille 
September 14,1995 industrial accident was the "direct cause" of his permanent total 
disability under Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-413? 
Standard of Review: This involves a mixed question. The interpretation of the 
term "direct causation" is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed 
under a "correctness" standard with no deference to the agency's determination, 
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because the appellate court has the power and duty to say what the law is and to 
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Drake v. Industrial Commission. 
939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). 
Review of the Commission's underlying factual findings regarding direct 
causation is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. Chase v. Industrial 
Commission. 872 P.2d 475 (Utah App. 1994). 
As in issue 2 above, the statute is to be liberally construed and any doubt as 
to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. E.g., State Tax 
Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); and 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977). 
Issue 4: Did Mr. DeMille meet his burden of proving that his industrial accident 
at Thurston Cable is the medical cause of his low back condition? 
Standard of Review: This is a mixed question of law and fact to which this 
Court extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determination "with 
varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of 'correctness and 
a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake v. Industrial Commission. 939 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the 
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Petitioner. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 
1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 
1977). 
Preservation for Appeal: All of the above issues were raised by Petitioner 
before the Utah Labor Commission with the exception of whether this Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413 (1997) is the applicable permanent total 
disability statute, and R612-1-10 of the Utah Administrative Code is the applicable 
Permanent Total Disability Rule. R612-1-10(C)(1)(c) is the applicable Rule as to 
"finality" of Labor Commission Orders. The Statutes and Rules are set forth in full 
in Addendum "A" hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Petitioners seek review of the Utah Labor 
Commission's Order tentatively finding Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled 
as a result of work related injuries. 
Course of Proceedings: Mr. DeMille filed an Application for Permanent Total 
Disability benefits sustained as the result of an industrial injury on September 14, 
1995. (R1 at 19). The Employer and its workers compensation Carrier filed an 
Answer to the Application on April 30,1999. (R1 at 40-43) and an Amended Answer 
on September 7,1999 (R1 at 47-48). Notice of Hearing was sent to all parties on 
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February 12, 2001 setting Mr. DeMille's claim for Hearing on April 4, 2001. (R1 at 
48). The Hearing was subsequently continued and after further discovery 
proceedings were conducted, a new Notice of Formal Hearing setting the claim for 
Hearing on April 3, 2001 was sent to all parties. (R1 at 53). 
On November 6, 2002 Administrative Law Judge Richard M. La Jeunesse 
entered his Findings fo Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order granting Petitioner's 
claim for permanent total disability benefits. (R1 at 165-181). Addendum "B". 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission on 
December 6, 2002 (R1 at 185-188). The Commission entered an Order Denying 
Petitioner's Motion for Review on May 30, 2003. (R1 at 222-225). Addendum "C". 
A Petition for Review was filed with this Court on June 27,2003. A Docketing 
statement was filed on August 5, 2003. 
On December 15, 2003 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack for 
Jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a Response on December 31, 2003 and Mr. DeMille 
filed a Reply to that Response on January 16,2004. On January 27,2004 the Court 
of Appeals issued an Order deferring the jurisdictional Motion to Dismiss for Briefing. 
On March 11, 2004, Respondent filed a Second Motion to Dismiss alleging 
recently decided authority which further supported it's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner 
filed a Response and on April 27,2004 the Court of Appeals again issued an Order 
deferring the jurisdictional issues. 
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are simple, 
S 
straightforward and not really disputed by the parties. A complete, detailed and 
largely unchallenged statement of facts is contained in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge, dated November 
6,2002 (R1 at 165-181). See also. Addendum "B". The Commission in it's Order 
Denying Motion for Review dated May 30, 2003, adopted those Findings. (R1 at 
222-225); See ajso, Addendum "C". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Order from which Petitioner seeks appellate review is not a "final Order 
which is subject to appellate review. It is a Tentative Finding of Permanent Total 
Disability and the Administrative Law Judge has not yet fully adjudicated this matter. 
Petitioner's Petition for Review is premature and this Court is without jurisdiction to 
review the Order as it presently stands. 
Even if the Order is subject to appellate review, Petitioner has failed to 
marshal the facts and evidence in support of the Order and the Petition should be 
dismissed for that reason as well. In any event Respondent did meet his burden to 
establish that his industrial accident was the direct cause of his present Permanent 
Total Disability status. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
INITIAL TENTATIVE FINDINGS OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY ARE 
NOT FINAL APPEALABLE ORDERS. 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), the Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction over the Commission's "final" adjudicative Orders. It is 
acknowledged that the Administrative Law Judge's Order and the Commission's 
Order on Motion for Review were only "tentative" findings of permanent total 
disability. On this basis Respondent previously moved this Court to dismiss the 
Petition for Review as the underlying Order was not a final Order subject to judicial 
review. The Court reserved the issue directing the parties to Brief it. 
On January 30, 2004, three days after that Order was issued by this Court, 
the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Thomas v. Color Country 
Management. 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201. That case involved the "finality" of an 
initial finding of permanent total disability by the Utah Labor Commission and 
whether such Orders were "final" for the purpose of enforcement and appellate 
review, the very issue this Court indicated it needed further briefing in order to 
resolve. 
The Supreme Court in Thomas specifically held as follows: 
Section 34A-2-413 (6) (a) specifically states that initial findings 
of permanent total disability are not final, ibjd at 9. 
***** 
While sections 34A-1-303 and 34A-2-801 of the Labor Code set 
forth a broad definition of what constitutes a final order, the language 
of section 34A-2-413 excepts the initial finding of permanent total 
disability from this broad definition of "final order" by expressly stating 
that the initial, tentative finding is not final, ibid at 11. 
In this case, like Thomas, only the interim, tentative finding of permanent total 
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disability has been made. Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's recent ruling in 
Thomas such Orders are not final for purposes of appeal. 
Additionally, this Court in Sloan v. Board of Review. 781 P.2d 463,465 (Utah 
App. 1989), held that "Because the order reserves something further for the agency 
to determine, we hold that the order of the commission is not a final appealable 
order." 
In further support of this argument, it should be noted that the Order appealed 
from in this case had not been designated by the Labor Commission as "final" for 
purposes of appellate review as such language is conspicuously missing from the 
Order below. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1)(f) and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 
(6)(c)(vii) (1988) require that final and thus appealable Orders of Administrative 
Agencies contain language putting the parties on notice that the Order is final and 
appealable. 
Finally, although Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10(C)(1 )(c) does provide that 
a preliminary determination of permanent total disability is final agency action for 
purposes of appellate review, that Administrative Rule adopted by the Commission, 
can not overcome a clearly contrary State statute and a final decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeal. It is improper rule making and can not serve to confer jurisdiction 
upon this Court. 
Petitioners argue that Utah Administrative Code R612-1-10(c)(1)(c), adopted 
after the Thomas decision, specifically provides that "preliminary determinations of 
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after the Thomas decision, specifically provides that "preliminary determinations of 
permanent total disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final 
agency action for purposes of appellate judicial review". This argument is flawed for 
several reasons. 
First, it is well established that an injured worker, like Petitioner herein, is 
entitled to the law as it existed at the time of his injury. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission. 704 P.2d 1168,1171 f.n.1 (Utah 1985). Utah Const. Co. v. 
Matheson. 534 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1975). Oakland Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission. 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974). Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission. 268 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1954). Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission. 740 P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987). Moore v. American Coal Co.. 737 
P.2d 789 (Utah 1987). Lantham Co. v. Industrial Commission. 717 P.2d 255, 256 
at f.n.1 (Utah 1986). The Administrative Rule cited by Petitioners was not in effect 
at the time of Respondent Kirk DeMillie's injury or even at the time of the filling of his 
Application for Hearing. 
Second, the Rule is a gross abuse of Administrative Rule Making. 
Administrative Agencies only have authority to set out procedural directives within 
their purview. In this case, the definition of what constitutes a "final" Order from the 
Labor Commission is not a procedural directive. The Utah Legislature, as 
specifically found in Thomas, stated that "Section 34A-2-413 (6) (a) specifically 
states that initial findings of permanent total disability are not final." 
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through Administrative Rulemaking to overturn a specific Statute adopted by the 
Utah State Legislature and overrule the Utah Supreme Court in interpreting that 
Statute. It is at best a blatant attempt by an executive administrative agency, with 
quasi-judicial authority to overrule the Utah State Legislature and the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Labor Commission, as an Administrative Agency can not create 
appellate jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist. 
In Target Trucking v. Labor Commission. 2005 UT App. 70 (February 17, 
2005) this Court held that: 
The administrative rule conflicts with the statute. An 
administrative body's rules must conform to, rather than be 
inconsistent, with statute. See Bradshaw v. Wilkinson Water Co.. 2004 
UT 38, H33,94 P.3d 242. The rule must, therefore, yield to the statute. 
An interim order of permanent total disability is not final and appealable 
until the requirements of Utah Code section 34A-2-413 (6) (b) are met. 
id-71. 
This Court has recently issued an opinion in the case of Ameritemps. Inc. v. 
Labor Commission. 2005 UT App. 491 (November 10,2005). In that case, the Court 
found the Labor Commission's "preliminary determination of permanent total 
disability is a seriatim final agency action, and this court does have subject matter 
jurisdiction to review it." 1J32. The Court in Ameritemps applied the three-part test 
in Union Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 999 P. 2d 17,21 (Utah 2000), 
to determine if an agency action is final: 
(1) Has the administrative decision making reached a stage where 
judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication? 
(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal 
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(2) Have rights or obligations been determined or will legal 
consequences flow form the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, 
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent 
agency action? 
A. Orderly Process of Adjudication. 
The Court in Ameritemps relies heavily on the fact that the Labor 
Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review in that case contained statutorily 
mandated "Notice of Appeal Rights" which indicated that a party could request 
reconsideration within twenty days of the date or the order, or within thirty days of the 
date of the Order, Petition this Court for judicial review of the Order. 
The Order Denying Motion for Review (R1 at 222-225) in Mr. DeMille's case 
significantly did not contain the statutorily mandated "Notice of Appeal Rights" 
because it was not a "final agency action" from which an appeal could be taken. The 
Labor Commission had issued an Order of Remand to the ALJ "... to complete the 
adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation and 
also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr. DeMille's counsel." (R1 at 224). 
Judicial review of this case did in fact disrupt the orderly process of 
adjudication. Although the Commission had issued an Order of Remand, they 
unofficially imposed a stay on all proceedings in this matter while the appeal was 
being taken. No request for stay was made by either party and no bond was ever 
posted by the Petitioners. Nevertheless, the Labor Commission refused to set the 
case for further Hearings to "complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMillie's claim for 
n 
permanent total disability compensation." 
Additionally, although statutorily mandated subsistence payments had been 
ordered by the ALJ and the Labor Commission, the Petitioners have not made any 
payments since filing their Petition for Review in this case over two years ago. By 
any measure, the appeal in this case of the preliminary determination of Permanent 
Total Disability has significantly disrupted the orderly process of adjudication. 
B. Rights or Obligations Determined. 
This Court in Ameritemps found that the second-prong had been met because 
"the Board had determined that Albert [the injured worker] was permanently totally 
disabled and also awarded permanent total disability compensation payments to 
Albert to start immediately." fl 21. The Court quoted with approval Baker v. Utah 
Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 970 P.2d 702,706 (Utah 1998) that an agency action was final 
where "the language of the order makes clear that the [agency] determined 
obligations of the parties with which the parties must immediately comply." 
The second-prong is not satisfied in this case, because although the 
Commission directed subsistence benefits to be paid, the Petitioners have never 
made any such payments, sought a stay on that obligation or posted an Appeal 
Bond. It is unjust and inequitable for the Petitioners to seek judicial review on the 
basis of an obligation that they have not paid or sought a stay from. By failing to 
make the ordered payments while this case was under review, or obtaining an stay 
on appeal and posting a bond, Petitioners have forfeited the right to invoke this 
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Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that rights or obligations have been 
determined in the Order Denying Motion for Review. 
In this regard, it is important to note that the Legislature has specifically 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (6) that: 
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not 
final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment 
activities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker 
Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative 
law judge: 
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation 
provider reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful 
employment; or 
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not 
submit a plan. (Emphasis added). 
By the very terms of the applicable statute the Order Denying Motion for 
Review/Order of Remand in this case was not a final agency action which could 
confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. 
C. Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural or Intermediate. 
The third-prong requires that the agency action from which the Petition for 
Review is taken not be preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with 
regard to subsequent agency action. It is impossible to view the Order in this case 
as anything but preliminary, preparatory and intermediate. The Commission was 
specific that it was making only a "tentative determination" of permanent total 
disability. (R1 at 224). Further, the Commission specifically issued an Order of 
Remand in order "to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim," which is 
13 
additional evidence that the Order was preliminary and an intermediate step in the 
permanent total disability process, since the Employer/Carrier would still be given 
the opportunity to present a reemployment plan which would demonstrate that Mr. 
DeMille was in fact not permanently totally disabled. 
For all of the above reasons, the Order Denying Motion for Review/Order of 
Remand in this case was not a final agency action from which a Petition for Review 
could be taken. This Court should decline to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over 
this case, and remand it back to the Labor Commission for further adjudicative 
proceedings. 
II 
MR. DEMILLE SATISFIED HIS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
HIS PERMEANT TOTAL DISABILITY STATUS WAS THE DIRECT 
RESULT OF HIS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
A. The Facts and the Law are to be Liberally Construed in Favor of 
Granting Compensation to Injured Workers. 
Few principles of workers compensation law are as well established in this 
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed 
in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be 
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle 
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); 
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. 
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 
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613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M& 
K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper 
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the 
Act, and stated as follows: 
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be 
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation 
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for 
the injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes. 
The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the 
course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses 
of conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for 
injuries to ^employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost 
and expense of conducting the business as aforesaid is added to the 
cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence, in the long 
run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act, 
therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him, 
and in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for 
the support of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in 
case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents might 
become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by 
requiring the business or enterprise to provide for such dependents, 
with the right of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such business or enterprise. 
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to all, and 
for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal construction 
in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition 
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in 
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favor of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. Jd. at 
1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
The Labor Commission affirmed the Findings, Conclusions and determinations 
of the Administrative Law Judge. The Administrative Law Judge in rendering his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law properly applied this vital rule of 
construction. His Findings and Conclusions evidence a "liberal construction" and 
"resolution of doubt in favor of the claim". 
Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, it must be resolved 
in favor of the injured worker and the awarding of benefits. Petitioner totally 
disregards and ignores these well founded and detailed Findings, and instead asks 
this Court to construe the facts in a light most favorable to the insurance company 
and the defeating of benefits. In short, they completely disregard this underlying and 
fundamental principle of Utah Workers' Compensation law. 
B. Petitioner Failed to Marshall the Evidence in Support of the Order. 
If Petitioner wishes to challenge Findings of Fact, it is required to marshal all 
of the evidence supporting the Agency's finding and show that, despite supporting 
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. Hales Sand and 
Granite. Inc. v. Audit Division. 842 P.2d 887,893 (Utah 1992). It has failed to do so. 
Petitioner failed to even mention significant Findings made by the Administrative 
Law Judge and the Commission. 
Those omitted Findings are pointed out in Respondent's Statement of Facts 
16 
above. 
As a result of Petitioner's failure to adequately marshal the facts and evidence 
it's Petition for Review should be dismissed.. To rule otherwise would allow any 
party on appeal to supplant Findings of the lower Court with that parties' own 
purported Findings without marshaling evidence or meeting the substantial evidence 
test. 
C. The Commission Correctly Concluded that Mr. DeMille had a 
"Significant Impairment" as that Term is Used in the Permanent Total Disability 
Statute. 
In order to be entitled to a finding of permanent total disability, the worker must 
prove a "compensable industrial injury" occurred, and that he has suffered some 
percentage of impairment. A finding of permanent total disability is appropriate 
when even a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial 
accident combined with other factors renders the Claimant unable to obtain 
employment. Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission. 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-102(8) (2000) defined "impairment" as a" a purely 
medical condition reflecting any anatomical or functional abnormality or loss. 
Impairment may be either temporary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial." 
There can be little question that Mr. DeMille sustained a "significant" impairment as 
a result of his 1995 industrial accident. Prior to that time, despite a preexisting 17% 
whole person impairment which was relatively asymptomatic, Mr. DeMille was able 
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to work. 
This is another area where the Petitioners have failed in their duty to marshal 
the evidence. The ALJ found and the Labor Commission concurred that "But for Mr. 
DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he likely would have continued 
relatively asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period." (R1 at 178). The 
medical records reflect, and the Labor Commission found, that Mr. DeMille's 
accident at Thurston on September 14,1995,"... produced scarring in muscle, spine 
and soft tissue, resulting in both anatomical and functional abnormality and loss." 
(R1 at 223). The ALJ specifically found that "[T]he respondents'(Petitioner's herein) 
interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in serious permanent 
exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems." (R1 at 178). 
The Petitioner's make much of the fact that Mr. DeMille's impairment cannot 
be considered significant because it has never been rated by a physician. Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-413(1)(b)(l) only requires a "significant impairment," not a 
"significant impairment rating." The significance of Mr. DeMille's impairment is 
reflected in the fact that Mr. DeMille's injuries caused by the 1995 industrial accident 
took him from employability with a preexisting 17% whole person impairment to 
permanent total disability. 
D. The Commission Correctly Determined that Mr. DeMille's September 
14, 1995 industrial Injury was the Direct Cause of his Permanent Total 
Disability. 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-413 (1)(b)(iii) provides that: 
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(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, 
the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of 
evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or 
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident 
or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total 
disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(Hi) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the 
direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability. 
(Emphasis added). 
Mr. DeMille does not take issue with Thurston Cable's definition of the term 
"direct cause" as "generally synonymous with the terms 'primary cause', 'real cause", 
"prepondering cause' and even 'proximate cause'" (Respondent's Brief at 28 and 
cases cited therein). 
In this case it is clear that Mr. DeMille had prior injuries to his back. That is 
not unusual for an employee of his age and with his work history. He did in fact 
already have a 17% whole person impairment for his low back prior to his 
September 14,1995 industrial accident. (R1 at 122). Despite those limitations Mr. 
DeMille was able to perform his job functions with Thurston Cable and remained 
gainfully employed. (R1 at 222-23). 
Administrative Law Judge Benjamin A. Sims appointed a Medical Panel 
comprised of Dr. Madison Thomas, neurologist and Dr. Glen Momberger, an 
othorpedic surgeon. On June 19, 1997 the Panel issued its Report. (R3 at 436-
441). In relevance here, the Panel specifically found as follows: 
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Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems 
would undoubtedly been made less severe, but likewise had it not been 
for the significant injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely 
have continued relatively asymptomatic for an indefinate period. Since 
the more recent injury produced a significant aggravation of the back 
problem, the panel will leave it to the ALJ to determine the legal 
responsibility for further treatment of the condition. (R3 at 440). 
There is no evidence in the record that Thurston Cable filed any Objection to 
the Medical Panel Report, despite the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601 
(2002). In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the report of the Medical Panel and 
found that on September 14,1995, Mr. DeMille in fact injured his low back and left 
leg when he fell off a front-end loader. 
Thurston Cable assembled a consultative Medical Panel composed of 
neurologists Dr. Moress and Dr. Scott Knorp. On October 26, 1999, that Panel 
essentially corroborated the conclusions reached by the Medical Panel. (R3 at 400). 
Judge La Jeunesse specifically found that: 
Judge Sims' 1997 Order conclusively confirmed that the 1995 industrial 
accident caused Mr. DeMille some back and left leg problems contrary 
to the opinions rendered by the respondents' medical penels. The 
preponderance of the medical evidence established that Mr. DeMille 
suffered ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy in part due to 
permanent aggravations caused by the 1995 accident. The undisputed 
medical evidence in the case verified that Mr. DeMille also suffered 
some spinal, soft tissue damage from infections accompanying the 
stimulator implant. No dispute existed that Freemont Comp's 
requirement of a two stage procedure for the stimulator implant caused 
Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the stimulator. (R1 at 
25). 
The Labor Commission in its Order Denying Motions for Review/Remand 
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specifically found that: 
Thurston's second argument is that Mr. DeMille failed to meet 
§34A-2-413(1)(b)(iii)'s requirement that 'the industrial accident... was 
the direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability." In 
considering this argument, the Commission notes Mr. DeMille was able 
to work prior to his accident at Thurston, but after the accident the 
resulting injuries and consequences of medical treatment left him 
unable to work, except for relatively short and unsuccessful efforts to 
rejoin the workforce. Mr. DeMille's inability to work as a result of the 
Thurston accident is confirmed by the medical evidence. Thus, Mr. 
DeMille's accident at Thurston is the direct cause of his permanent total 
disability. (R1 at 223-24). 
The overwhelming weight of the undisputed evidence is that Mr. DeMille's 
1995 industrial injury was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. 
Petitioners in their Statement of Facts omit the significant medical evidence cited 
above, and thus they again fail in their duty to marshal the evidence. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Order below from which Petitioner seeks judicial review is not a final 
Order and is thus not subject to judicial review. Petitioner has failed to marshal the 
facts and evidence in support of the award; however, the overwhelming weight of the 
facts and evidence demonstrate that Mr. DeMille was in fact entitled to a tentative 
Finding of Permanent Total Disability. 
Respondent respectfully requests that the tentative Finding of Permanent Total 
Disability be upheld and that this matter be remanded to the Administrative Law 
Judge to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total 
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disability compensation, and also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr. 
DeMille's counsel. 




for Kirk S. Demille 
I 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of November, 2005, a copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KIRK S. DEMILLE was hand-delivered 
and/or mailed, as follows: 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS (1) original and (7) copies 
450 South State Street - 5TH Floor 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0230 
Mr. Alan L. Hennebold (2 copies) 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Post Office Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Mr. Mark D. Dean (2 copies) 
Ms. Kristy L. Bertelsen 
BLACKBURN & STOLL 
77 West 200 South Suite #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1609 
Mr. Kirk S. DeMille (1 copy) 
619 South 1100 East, #6 




Counsel for Kirk S. Demi lie 
34A-2-413 UTAH LABOR CODE 416 
the member. This Subsection (5) does not apply to the items 
listed in Subsection (4)(b)(iv). 
(6) (a) For any permanent impairment caused by an indus-
trial accident that is not otherwise provided for in the 
schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial 
disability compensation shall be awarded by the commis-
sion based on the medical evidence. 
(b) Compensation for any impairment described in 
Subsection (6Xa) shall, as closely as possible, be propor-
tionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in 
this section. 
(c) Permanent partial disability compensation may 
not: 
(i) exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the 
period of compensation for permanent total loss of 
bodily function; and 
(ii) be paid for any permanent impairment that 
existed prior to an industrial accident. 
(7) The amounts specified in this section are all subject to 
the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as 
specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a 
maximum of 66-V3% of the state average weekly wage a t the 
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid. 1997 
34A-2-413. Permanent total disabil ity — Amount of 
payments — Rehabil i tat ion. 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from 
an industrial accident or occupational disease, the em-
ployee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. 
(b) TD establish entitlement to permanent total disabil-
ity compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impair-
ment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives 
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; 
and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, 
the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combina-
tion of impairments that limit the employee's ability 
to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused im-
pairment or combination of impairments prevent the 
employee from performing the essential functions of 
the work activities for which the employee has been 
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease that is the basis for the employ-
ee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work rea-
sonably available, taking into consideration the em-
ployee's age, education, past work experience, medi-
cal capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability 
benefits other than those provided under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant, 
may be presented to the commission, but is not binding 
and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the 
initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-'%% of 
the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the 
sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus 
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2Xa) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly 
compensation rate under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 36% of 
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or 
before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability com-
pensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in 
effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-
2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate 
under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from 
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensation 
rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all 
remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall com-
mence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or 
Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or 
after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-
2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate 
under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by 
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future 
liability paid before'or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Sub-
section (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after 
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an employee has received compensation from the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of dis-
abilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, 
to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of 
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the em-
ployee during the same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a sum-
mary of reemployment activities undertaken pursu-
ant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemploy-
ment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits 
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan 
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider 
reasonably designed to return the employee to gain-
ful employment or the employer or its insurance 
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice 
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not 
submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to 
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipu-
lated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation 
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by 
the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsec-
tion (6Xa)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administra-
tive law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability com-
pensation payments to provide for the employee's 
subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or 
medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given, 
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection 
(6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liabil-
ity under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer 
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the 
plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, 
medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
placement services, or incentives calculated to facili-
tate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable 
disability compensation to provide for the employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall 
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The em-
ployer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently 
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
administrative law judge on the administrative law 
judge's own motion to make a final decision of perma-
nent total disability. 
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administra-
tive law judge shall order that the employee be paicl 
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the 
employee became permanently totally disabled, as deter-
mined by a final order of the commission based on the 
facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or 
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee rea-
sonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job 
earning at least minimum wage provided that employ-
ment may not be reguired to the extent that it would 
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability 
benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement 
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medi-
cally appropriate, part-time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employ-
ee's gross income from the work provided under Subsec-
tion (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier 
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability 
compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess 
of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally 
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, 
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained 
in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding 
the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under 
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the 
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate part-
time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job 
that would require the employee to undertake work 
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual 
functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to re-
duce permanent total disability benefits as provided in 
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, 
part-time employment has been offered but the employee 
has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the em-
ployee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent 
partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an 
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the 
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemploy-
ment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss 
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the 
administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully 
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific 
findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use 
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, 
or any combination of two such body members constitutes 
total and permanent disability, to be compensated accord-
ing to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent totaf disability pursuant to 
Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodi-
cally reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except 
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or 
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility 
to determine whether the worker remains permanently 
totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than 
once every three years after an award is final, unless good 
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cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical 
evaluations; 
(Hi) employee submission to reasonable rehabilita-
tion evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax 
Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Sec-
tion 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or 
questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for 
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee 
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel 
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert 
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the 
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at 
the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reason-
able reexamination of a permanent total disability find-
ing, an administrative law judge may order the suspen-
sion of the employee's permanent total disability benefits 
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total 
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably 
raises the issue of an employee's continued entitle-
ment to permanent total disability compensation 
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may 
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing 
on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by 
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-in-
sured employer's belief that the employee is no longer 
permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (HXfXi) dem-
onstrates good cause, as determined by the Division 
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall 
adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in 
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the 
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent 
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the 
employee's participation in medically appropriate, 
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be consid-
ered in the reexamination or hearing with other 
evidence relating to the employee's status and condi-
tion. 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the admin-
istrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees 
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the 
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the 
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee 
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. 
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total 
disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication 
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured 
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall con-
tinue to pay the permanent total disability compensation 
benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
34A-2-414. Benefits in case of death — Distribution of 
award to dependents — Death of dependents 
— Remarriage of surviving spouse. 
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or 
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of 
all the dependents, as may be determined by an admin-
istrative law judge. 
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion the 
benefits among the dependents in the manner tha t the 
administrative law judge considers just and equitable. 
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be 
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proper, 
and shall operate to discharge all other claims. 
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid, 
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries 
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the 
administrative law judge. 
(3) In all cases of death when: 
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or 
more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the surviv-
ing spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudi-
cation on behalf of tha t individual and the minor children; 
and 
(b) all of the dependents are minors, the application 
shall be made by the guardian or next friend of the minor 
dependents. 
(4) The administrative law judge may, for the purpose of 
protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents 
the administrative law judge considers incapable of doing so, 
provide a method of safeguarding any payments due the minor 
dependents. 
(5) Should any dependent of a deceased employee die dur-
ing the period covered by weekly payments authorized by this 
section, the right of the deceased dependent to compensation 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, shall cease. 
(6) (a) If a surviving spouse, who is a dependent of a 
deceased employee and who is receiving the benefits of 
this chapter or Chapter 3 remarries, that individual's sole 
right after the remarriage to further payments of compen-
sation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum the 
lesser of: 
(i) the balance of the weekly compensation pay-
ments unpaid from the time of remarriage to the end 
of six years or 312 weeks from the date of the injury 
from which death resulted; or 
(ii) an amount equal to 52 weeks of compensation 
at the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse 
was receiving at the time of such remarriage. 
(b) (i) If there are other dependents remaining at the 
time of remarriage, benefits payable under this chap-
ter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
shall be paid to such person as an administrative law 
judge may determine, for the use and benefit of the 
other dependents. 
(ii) The weekly benefits to be paid under Subsec-
tion (6)(b)(i) shall be paid at intervals of not less than 
four weeks. 1997 
34A-2-415. Increase of award to children and depen-
dent spouse — Effect of death, marriage, ma-
jority, or terminat ion of dependency of chil-
dren — Death, divorce, or remarriage of 
spouse. 
Xf an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent 
spouse or dependent minor child or children, as provided in 
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the 
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease at: 
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condition is not fixed for rating purposes, the interest 
shall commence from the date the permanent partial 
impairment can be medically determined. 
3. Permanent partial or permanent total disability 
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund or the Uninsured Employers* Fund shall be due 
and payable as soon as reasonably practical after #n 
order is issued. 
R612-1-6. Issuance of Checks. 
A. Any entity issuing compensation checks or drafts 
must make those checks/drafts payable directly to the 
injured worker and must mail them directly to the 
last known mailing address of the injured worker, 
with the following exceptions: 
1. If the employer provides full salary to the injured 
worker in return for the worker's compensation ben-
efits, the check may be mailed to the worker at the 
place of employment; 
2. If the employer coordinates other benefits with 
the worker's compensation benefits, the check may be 
mailed to the worker at the place of employment. 
B In no case may the check be made out to the 
employer. 
C. Where attorney fees are involved, a separate 
check should be issued to the worker's attorney in the 
amount approved or ordered by the Commission, 
unless otherwise directed by the Commission. Pay-
ment of the worker's attorney by issuing a check 
payable to the worker and his attorney jointly consti-
tutes a violation of this rule. 
"R612-1-T. AcceptanceJDenia\ of a Claim. 
A. Upon receiving a claim for workers' compensa-
tion benefits, the insurance carrier or self-insured 
employer shall promptly investigate the claim and 
begin payment of compensation" within 21 days from 
the date of notification of a valid claim or the insur-
ance carrier or self-insured employer shall send the 
claimant and the division written notice on a division 
form or letter containing similar information, within 
21 days of notification, that further investigation is 
needed stating the reason(s) for further investigation. 
Each insurance carrier or self-insured employer shall 
complete its investigation within 45 days of receipt of 
the claim and shall commence the payment of benefits 
or notify the claimant and division in writing that the 
claim is denied and the reason(s) why the claim is 
being denied. 
B. The payment of compensation shall be consid-
ered overdue if not paid within 21 days of a valid claim 
or within the 45 days of investigation unless denied. 
C. Failure to make payment or to deny a claim 
within the 45 day time period without good cause 
shall result in a referral of the insurance company to 
the Insurance Department for appropriate disciplin-
ary action and may be cause for revocation of the 
self-insurance certification for a self-insured em-
ployer Good cause is defined as: 
1. Failure by an employee claiming benefits to sign 
requested medical releases; 
2. Injury or occupational disease did not occur 
within the scope of employment; 
3. Medical information does not support the claim; 
4. Claim was not filed within the statute of limita-
tions; 
5 Claimant is not an employee of the employer 
he/she is making a claim against; 
6 Claimant has failed to cooperate in the investi-
gation of the claim; 
7. A pre-existing condition is the sole cause of the 
medical problem and not the claimed work-related 
injury or occupational disease; 
8. Tested positive for drugs or alcohol; or 
9. Other - a very specific reason must be given. 
D. If an insurance carrier or self-insured employer 
so as to process the claim in a timely fashion, a later 
denial of benefits based on newly discovered informa-
tion may be allowed. 
R612-1-8. Insurance Carrier/Employer Liability. 
A. This rule governs responsibility for payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for industrial acci-
dents when: 
1. The worker's ultimate entitlement to benefits is 
not in dispute; but 
2. There is a dispute between self-insured employ-
ers and/or insurers regarding their respective liability 
for the injured worker's benefits arising out of sepa-
rate industrial accidents which are compensable un-
der Utah law. 
B. In cases meeting the criteria of subsection A, the 
self-insured employer or insurer providing workers' 
compensation coverage for the most recent compensa-
ble injury shall advance workers' compensation ben-
efits to the injured worker. The benefits advanced 
shall be limited to medical benefits and temporary 
total disability compensation. The benefits advanced 
shall be paid according to the entitlement in effect on 
the date of the earliest related injury. 
1 The self-insured employer or insurance carrier 
advancing benefits shall notify the non-advancing 
party(s) within the time periods as specified in rule 
R612-1-7, that benefits are to be advanced pursuant to 
this rule. 
2. The self-insured employers or insurers not ad-
vancing benefits, upon notification from the advanc-
ing party, shall notify the advancing party within 10 
working days of any potential defenses or limitations 
of the non-advancing party(s) liability. 
C. The parties are encouraged to settle liabilities 
pursuant to this rule, however, any party may file a 
request for agency action with the Commission for 
determination of liability for the workers' compensa-
tion benefits a t issue. 
D. The medical utilization decisions of the self-
insured employer or insurer advancing benefits pur-
suant to this rule shall be presumed reasonable with 
respect to the issue of reimbursement. 
R612-1-9. Compensation Agreements . 
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or em-
ployer may enter into a compensation agreement for 
the purpose of resolving a worker's compensation 
claim. Compensation agreements must be approved 
by the Commission. The compensation agreement 
must be that contained on Form 019 of the Commis-
sion forms and shall include the following informa-
tion-
1 Signatures of the parties involved*, 
2 Form 122 - Employer's First Report of Injury; 
3. Doctor's report of impairment rating; 
4. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement. 
B. Failure to provide any of the above documenta-
tion and forms may result in the return of the com-
pensation agreement to the carrier or self-insured 
employer without approval. 
R612-1-10. Permanent Total Disability. 
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total 
disability compensation under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
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1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disabil-
ity claims arising from accident or disease prior to 
May 1, 1995. 
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disabil-
ity claims arising from accident or disease on or after 
May 1, 1995. 
B. For claims arising from accident or disease on or 
after July 1, 1988 and prior to May 1, 1995, the 
Commission is required under Section 34A-2-413, to 
make a finding of total disability as measured by the 
substance of the sequential decision-making process 
of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, amended April 1, 
1993. The use of the term "substance of the sequential 
decision-making process" is deemed to confer some 
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of 
discretion in making its findings relative to perma-
nent total disability. The Commission does not inter-
pret the code section to eliminate the requirement 
tha t a finding by the Commission in permanent and 
total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not 
final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation 
has been accomplished. 
1. In the event that tlje Social Security Administra-
tion or its designee has made, or is in the process of 
making, a determination of disability under the fore-
going process, the Commission may use this informa-
tion in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf. 
2. In evaluating industrial claims in which the 
injured worker has qualified for Social Security dis-
ability benefits, the Commission will determine if a 
significant cause of the disability is the claimant's 
industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or 
causes. 
3. To make a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability the Commission incorporates the rules of 
disability determination in 20 CFR 404.1520, 
amended April 1, 1993. The sequential decision mak-
ing process referred to requires a series of questions 
and evaluations to be made in sequence. In short, 
these are: 
a. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful 
activity? 
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe im-
pairment? 
c. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the 
duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended 
April 1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 20 CFR 
Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993? 
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 
doing past relevant work? 
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 
doing any other work? 
4. After the Commission has made a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability: 
a. In those cases arising after July 1,1994, the 
Commission shall order initiation of payment of per-
manent total disability compensation; 
b. the Commission shall review a summary of 
reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the 
Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act, as well as 
any qualified reemployment plan submitted by the 
employer or its insurance carrier; and 
c. unless otherwise stipulated, the Commission 
shall hold a hearing to consider the possibility of 
rehabilitation and reemployment of the claimant 
pending final adjudication of the claim. 
5. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the 
parties, the Commission shall issue an order finding 
or denying permanent total disability based upon the 
preponderance of the evidence and with due consider-
ation of the vocational factors in combination with the 
residual functional capacity which the commission 
incorporates as published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P 
Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993. 
C. For permanent total disability claims arising on 
or after May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a 
two-step adjudicative process. First, the Commission 
must make a preliminary determination whether the 
applicant is permanently and totally disabled. If so, 
the Commission will proceed to the second step, in 
which the Commission will determine whether the 
applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated. 
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Perma-
nent Total Disability: On receipt of an application for 
permanent total disability compensation, the Adjudi-
cation Division will assign an Administrative Law 
Judge to conduct evidentiary proceedings to deter-
mine whether the applicant's circumstances meet 
each of the elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-
413(l)(b) and (c). 
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the 
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(l)(b) and 
(c), the ALJ will issue a preliminary determination of 
permanent total disability and shall order the em-
ployer or insurance carrier to pay permanent total 
disability compensation to the applicant pending com-
pletion of the second step of the adjudication process. 
The payment of permanent total disability compensa-
tion pursuant to a preliminary determination shall 
commence as of the date established by the prelimi-
nary determination and shall continue until other-
wise ordered. 
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary 
determination may obtain additional agency review 
by either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board 
pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-80K3). If a timely mo-
tion for review of the ALJ's preliminary determination 
is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Ap-
peals Board, no further adjudicative or enforcement 
proceedings shall take place pending the decision of 
the Commissioner or Board. 
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total 
disability by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals 
Board is a final agency action for purposes of appellate 
judicial review. 
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commis-
sioner, the Appeals Board or an appellate court, an 
appeal of the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board's 
preliminary determination of permanent total disabil-
ity shall not delay the commencement of "second step" 
proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent 
total disability compensation as ordered by the pre-
liminary determination. 
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant 
a request for stay if the requesting party has filed a 
petition for judicial review and the Commissioner or 
Appeals Board determine that: 
(i) the requesting party has a substantia/ possibility 
of prevailing on the merits; 
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable 
injury unless a stay is granted; and 
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to 
other parties to the proceeding. 
2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation: 
Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413(6), if the first step 
of the adjudicatory process results in a preliminary 
finding of permanent total disability, an additional 
inquiry must be made into the applicant's ability to be 
reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive 
such additional proceedings. 
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(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether 
the applicant can be reemployed or rehabilitated. 
(i) As par t of the hearing, the ALJ will review a 
summary of reemployment activities undertaken pur-
suant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a 
reemployment plan meeting the requirements set 
forth in Subsection 34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsec-
tions 34A-2-413(6)(d)(i) through (iii). 
(b) Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b) the em-
ployer or insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
disability compensation for any combination of dis-
abilities of any kind in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensa-
tion rate. 
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may 
be recouped by the employer or insurance carrier by 
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future 
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide 
for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilita-
tion process is subject to the provisions of Subsection 
34A-2-413(4)(b), described in subsection 2.(b) above, 
but can be funded by reasonably offsetting the ad-
vance of disability compensation against future liabil-
ity normally paid after the initial 312 weeks. 
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation 
to provide for an employee's subsistence during the 
rehabilitation process, a portion of the stream of 
future weekly disability compensation payments may 
be discounted from the future to the present to accom-
modate payment. Should this be necessary, the em-
ployer or insurance carrier shall be allowed to reason-
ably offset the amounts paid against future liability 
payable after the initial 312 weeks. In this process, 
care should be exercised to reasonably minimize ad-
verse financial impact on the employee. 
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the 
reasonableness of any proposed offset, the matter may 
be submitted to an ALJ for determination. 
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413C7) and (9) require the 
applicant to fully cooperate in any evaluation or 
reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result in 
dismissal of the applicant's claim or reduction or 
elimination of benefit payments including disability 
compensation and subsistence allowance amounts, 
consistent with the provisions of Section 34A-2-413(7) 
and (9). 
(d) Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer 
or its insurance carrier to diligently pursue any prof-
fered reemployment plan. Failure to do so shall result 
in a final award of permanent total disability compen-
sation to the applicant. 
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second 
step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful 
rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall enter a 
final order for continuing payment of permanent total 
disability compensation. The period for payment of 
such compensation shall be commence on the date the 
employee became permanently and totally disabled, 
as determined by the ALJ. 
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "sec-
ond step" proceeding, the ALJ concludes that success-
ful rehabilitation and/or reemployment is possible, 
the ALJ shall enter a final order to that effect, which 
order shall contain such direction to the parties as the 
ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implemen-
tation and continuation of rehabilitation and/or reem-
ployment. As necessary under the particular circum-
stances of each case, the ALJ's final order shall 
provide for reasonable offset of payments of any 
disability compensation tha t constitute an overpay-
ment under Subsection 34A-2-413(4)(b). 
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administra-
tive and judicial review provided by law. 
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards 
and definitions apply: 
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to med-
ical restrictions and other provisions of the Act and 
rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant 
if such work meets the following criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a 
resident of the claimant's community would consider 
to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is 
within the distance the claimant was traveling to 
work prior to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; 
and 
c. The work provides a gross income at least equiv-
alent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the 
time of the accident the claimant was earning more 
than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning a t the time 
of the accident, if the employee was earning less than 
the state average weekly wage then in effect. 
2. Cooperation: As determined by an administrative 
law judge, an employee is not entitled to permanent 
total disability compensation or subsistence benefits 
unless the employee fully cooperates with any evalu-
ation or reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate 
the cooperation of the employee using, but not limited 
to, the following factors: attendance, active participa-
tion, effort, communication with the plan coordinator, 
and compliance with the requirements of the voca-
tional plan. In determining if these factors were met, 
the ALJ shall consider relevant changes in the em-
ployee's documents medical condition. 
3. Diligent Pursuit: The employer or its insurance 
carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan. The ALJ will evaluate the employer or insurance 
carrier's diligent pursuit of the plan using, but not 
limited to, the following factors: timely payment of 
expenses and benefits outline in the vocational plan, 
and as required by the educational institution provid-
ing the vocational training, communication with the 
employee, compliance with the requirements of the 
vocational plan, and timely modification of the plan as 
required by documented changes in the employee's 
medical condition. 
4. Resolution of disputes regarding "cooperation" 
and "diligent pursuit": If a party believes another 
party is not cooperating with or diligently pursing 
either the evaluations necessary to establish a plan, 
or the requirements of an approved reemployment or 
rehabilitation plan, the aggrieved party shall submit 
to the workers' compensation mediation unit an out-
line of the specific instances of non-cooperation or lack 
of diligence. Other parties may submit a reply. The 
Mediation Unit will promptly schedule mediation to 
reestablish cooperation among the parties necessary 
to evaluate or comply with the plan. If mediation is 
unsuccessful, a party may request the Adjudication 
Division resolve the dispute. The Adjudication Divi-
sion will conduct a hearing on the matter within 30 
days and shall issue a written decision with 10 days 
thereafter. 
R612-1-11. Burial Expenses . 
(1) Pursuant to Section 34A-2-418 if death results 
from an industrial injury or occupational disease, 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Case No- 20001059 
* 
KIRK S. DEMILLE, * FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Petitioner, * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
* 
vs. * AND ORDER 
THURSTON CABLE CONSTRUCTION * Judge: Richard M. La Jeunesse 
and/or FREEMNONT COMP., * 
Respondents, * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Old Historic Courtroom 97 East St. George Blvd. St. George, Utafi, on 
May 13, 2002, at 1:00 p.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Richard M. La Jeunesse, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Kirk DeMille, was present and represented by his attorney 
Virginius Dabney. 
The respondents were represented by attorney Henry K. Chai II. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioner, Kirk DeMille, filed an "Application For Hearing" with the Utah Labor 
Commission on June 5, 2001, and claimed entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation. Mr. DeMille's claim for workers' compensation benefits derived from a low back 
injury he suffered in an industrial accident on September 14, 1995. 
The respondents claimed that the September 14,1995 industrial injury did not cause Mr. DeMille 
to become permanently and totally disabled. The respondents argued that Mr. DeMille suffered 
no permanent impairment as a result of the September 14,1995 industrial accident beyond that 
already endured by Mr. DeMille prior to the September 14, 1995 event. 
II, ISSUE. 
Did the September 14 1995 industrial accident cause Kirk DeMille to become permanently and 
totally disabled? 
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III, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation derived from a low back injury 
he suffered in an industrial accident on September 14, 1995. Mr. DeMille had significant low 
back problems prior to September 15,1995. 
On August 7, 1987 Judge Richard Sumsion entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in Case No. 86000508 Kirk DeMille v. Granger-Hunter Improvement District (hereinafter 
the 1987 Order). Case No. 86000508 involved a low back injury Mr. DeMille suffered when he 
attempted to open a fire hydrant valve with an oversized pipe wrench while employed with the 
Granger-Hunter Improvement District on March 7, 1986. 
In his 1987 Order Judge Sumsion held that Mr. DeMille sustained a 12.75% whole person 
impairment as a result of low back problems that preexisted the March 7, 1986 industrial 
accident. Judge Sumsion further found that Mr. DeMille sustained a 4.25% whole person 
impairment from the March 7, 1986 low back injury. In sum, as of March 7, 1986 Mr. DeMille 
endured a 17% whole person impairment consequent to low back problems.1 
On August 8, 1997 Judge Benjamin Sims entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order in Case No. 96920 Kirk DeMille v. Thurston Cable Construction et al (hereinafter the 
1997 Order). Case No. 96920 involved the same industrial accident and injury as the present 
case. Judge Sims found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille injured his low back and left 
leg when he fell off a front-end loader. Judge Sims determined that Mr. DeMille5 s September 
14, 1995 injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Thurston Cable 
Construction (Thurston).2 
On November 9, 2000 Mr. DeMille filed an action principally concerned with his claim for 
additional temporary total disability compensation. On March 16, 2001 I denied a belated 
motion by Mr. DeMille to amend his claim for the inclusion of permanent total disability. On 
June 5, 2001, Mr. DeMille filed the present Application for Hearing on the issue of permanent 
total disability 
1
 See also: November 10, 1987 Order Granting Motion for Review (this order only dealt 
with the issue concerning the medical necessity of surgery and in all other respects affirmed 
Judge Sumsion's 1987 Order). See also: January 19, 1989 Order for Reimbursement from the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
2
 The Employers' First Report of Injury noted that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille 
fell six feet from a Michigan Loader and landed on his left leg and back. 
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On January 2,2002 I entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order with respect to 
Mr. DeMille's claim for additional temporary total disability compensation related to the 
September 14, 1995 industrial accident with Thurston, [the January 2, 2002 Order]. In the 
January 2, 2002 Order I held that Both Mr. DeMille's treating physicians, Dr. Home and Dr. 
Hagen, opined that Mr. DeMille was totally disabled with little hope for improvement. The 
opinions of Dr. Home and Dr. Hagen categorized Mr. DeMille as permanently totally disabled 
which, as a matter of law precluded an award of ongoing temporary total disability benefits. 
At the hearing on May 13, 20021 accepted into evidence Exhibit's "P-l," "P-2," and Volume 3 
of the Medical Exhibit accepted in the prior proceeding as Exhibit "J-1."3 On August 22,2002, 
some three months after the close of evidence in this case, Mr. DeMille, through his attorney Mr. 
Dabney, attempted to submit some additional medical records into evidence. The respondents 
objected to the submission of the additional medical records. I hereby disallow the submission of 
the additional medical records filed by Mr. DeMille August 22, 2002 and give them no further 
consideration. 
IV- FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Prior Orders. 
To the extent that they are compatible with the present Order, I hereby adopt the findings set 
forth in the 1997 Order and the January 2, 2002 Order. 
B. Employment 
The 1997 Order established that Thurston employed Mr. DeMille on September 14, 1995. 
C Compensation Rate. 
The 1997 Order found that on September 14,1995 Mr. DeMille was married with three 
dependent children. The 1997 Order established that on September 15, 1995 Mr. DeMille's 
compensation with Thurston equaled $12.00 per hour, 40 hours per week, for an average weekly 
wage of $480.00 per week. Mr. DeMille's wages determined by the 1997 Order confirmed 
$335.00 per week as the appropriate permanent total disability compensation rate for the 
September 14,1995 injury. 
3At the hearing on April 3, 2001 the parties agreed to remove pages 53-58 from Volume I 
of Exhibit "J-L" At the hearing on May 13, 2002 I sustained objections to the admissibility of 
Exhibit's "P-3W and "P-4" into evidence. 
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D. Prior Low Back Injuries, 
As discussed infra, Mr. DeMiile suffered a 17% whole person impairment from low back injuries 
prior to the September 14, 1995 industrial accident. 
E. The September 14,1995 Industrial Injury. 
The 1997 Order found that on September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMiile injured his low back and left leg 
when he fell off a front-end loader. Mr. DeMiile's September 14,1995 injury arose out of and in 
the course of his employment with Thurston. For the sake of clarity, I repeat some of the facts 
set forth in January 2, 2002 Order. 
On September 21, 1995 Dr. Jonathan Home M.D. diagnosed Mr. DeMiile with: 
1. Radiculopathy left leg L5 nerve root. 
2. Solid fusion L4-L5 vertebra with retained internal hardware two AD 
screws and cerclage wire.4 
3. New strain/sprain contusion lumbosacral spine possible disc herniation. 
[Exhibit " J - r Vol. II p. 294]. 
On September 28,1995 a Lumbar Myelogram and Post Myelogram CT performed by Dr. Steven 
Davis M.D. disclosed: | 
The post myleogram CT images demonstrate again the post operative changes 
with solid appearing bone graft material posterolateral extending from L4 through 
SI. There is a very small central herniated nucleus pulposus at L5-S1 which 
indents the thecal sac but does not compress adjacent nerve roots. The remaining 
levels are unremarkable, [id. at 82]. 
On October 4,1995 Dr. Home observed that: 
The myelogram and CT scan did not help us very much, it didn't show anything 
new. [id. at 297]. 
4
 Mr. DeMille's fusion occurred prior to his September 14,1995 industrial accident. 
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On October 17, 1995 Dr. Home removed the hardware from Mr. DeMille's prior lumbar fusion 
which involved: 
1. Exploration of lumbar spine fusion of L4-L5. 
2. Removal of two screws, two washers, HO type, and removal of cerclage 
wire. 
3. Saucerization of metallurgical osteitis, [id. at Vol. III]. 
On January 19,1996 Dr. John Davis took flexion and extension view x-rays of Mr. DeMille's 
lumbar spine which revealed: 
Post surgical changes lower lumbar spine. Associated degenerative changes lower 
lumbar spine. Facet joint narrowing L3-4 and L5-S1 is moderate. Severe 
narrowing L4-5 Facet may be post surgical in nature, [id. Vol. I at 83]. 
The respondents assembled a medical panel composed of Dr. Gerald Moress M.D., neurologist, 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook M.D., orthopedic surgeon and, Dr. Robert Burgoyne M.D., a psychiatrist. 
On March 10, 1996 the respondents' medical panel concluded: 
The panel doubts that there is any underlying physical problem other than the pain 
disorder that Mr. DeMille shows. The panel felt the pain disorder was not related 
to the industrial incident5 but was characterological and related to events that pre-
existed the industrial incident. We were unable to see any residual from the 
industrial incident, [id. Vol. II at 391]. 
On November 13, 1996 Dr. Home noted: 
An electromyogram and EMG was performed which showed positive 
radiculopathy, which is 100% evidence of continued problems with the nerve root 
components for the left sciatic nerve, which have been part of the patient's 
problem all along, [id. Vol. II at 313]. 
5
 The September 14, 1995 industrial accident. 
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Judge Sims appointed a medical panel that consisted of Dr. Madison Thomas M.D., neurologist 
and, Dr. Glen Momberger M.D., orthopedic surgeon. On June 19, 1997 the Labor Commission 
medical panel concluded: 
Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems would 
undoubtedly been less severe, but likewise had it not been for the significant 
injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely have continued relatively 
asymptomatic for an indefinite period. Since the more recent injury produced a 
significant aggravation of the back problem the panel will leave it to the ALJ to 
determine the legal responsibility for further treatment of the condition, [id. Vol. 
II at 440]. 
In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the report of the medical panel and found that on 
September 14,1995 Mr. DeMille in fact injured his low back and left leg when he fell off the 
front-end loader. 
On April 28,1998 Dr. Home operated on Mr. DeMille and inserted a: "thoracic spine dorsal 
epidural dorsal column stimulator." [id. Vol. I. at 6]. The stimulator became infected and Mr. 
DeMille endured a ten month course of hospitalizations and six surgical interventions, [id. Vol I. 
it 12,24, 29, 30, 39, and 94; Vol. II at 204,206, and 268]. On February 19, 1999 Dr. Home 
emoved the stimulator, [id. Vol. I at 74]. Dr. Home adamantly proclaimed that: 
NONE OF THIS INFECTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD NOT THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY6 INSISTED ON A TWO STAGE PROCEDURE, 
WHICH ALLOWED AN INFECTION TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE LEFT 
FLANK WHICH SIMMERED AND FINALLY RAISED IT'S HEAD AND 
BECAME A REAL INFECTION AND CELLULITIS LAST WEEK. [id. Vol. II 
at 332]. 
The respondents assembled a second medical panel composed of neurologists Dr. Moress and Dr. 
Scott Knorp. [id. Vol. II at 400]. On October 26, 1999 the respondents' second medical panel 
essentially corroborated the conclusions reached bv the respondent's first medical panel, [id. at 
400-402]. 
On November 8, 2000 Dr. Home concluded: 
He has continued severe low back and left leg pain with radiculopathy 
arachnoiditis, perispinal scarring from infection, soft tissue scarring in muscles 
and supporting tissues of the back. [id. Vol. II at 359]. 
6
 Respondent Freemont Comp. 
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Judge Sims' 1997 Order conclusively confirmed that the 1995 industrial accident caused Mr. 
DeMille some serious back and left leg problems contrary to the opinions rendered by the 
respondents' medical panels. In the January 2, 2002 Order I found that: 
[t]he preponderance of the medical evidence established that Mr. DeMille 
suffered ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy in part due to 
permanent aggravations caused by the 1995 accident. The undisputed medical 
evidence in this case verified that Mr. DeMille also suffered some spinal, soft 
tissue damage from infections accompanying the stimulator implant. No dispute 
existed that Freemont Comp's requirement of a two stage procedure for the 
stimulator implant caused Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the 
stimulator. 
F. Permanent Total Disability. 
1. Significant Impairment Caused by the September 14,1995 Industrial 
Accident 
The respondents correctly observed that Mr. DeMille suffered from a 17% whole person 
impairment due to low back problems that pre-dated the September 14, 1995 industrial accident 
in the present case. The respondents then noted that Mr. DeMille received no additional 
impairment rating for the additional injuries caused by the September 14, 1995 industrial 
accident. Because nobody assigned a percentage of impairment to Mr. DeMille's injuries caused 
by the September 14, 1995 industrial accident, the respondents argued he did not suffer a 
significant impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (l)(b)(i) (1995). 
The respondents overlooked several important conclusions contained in the determinative 
medical evidence in this case. On June 19, 1997 the Labor Commission Medical Panel 
concluded: 
Had it not been for the initial injury in 1985, the petitioner's problems would 
undoubtedly been less severe, but likewise had it not been for the significant 
injury on 14 September 1995, he might quite likely have continued relatively 
asymptomatic for an indefinite period. Since the more recent injury produced a 
significant aggravation of the back problem the panel will leave it to the ALJ to 
determine the legal responsibility for further treatment of the condition, [id. Vol. 
II at 440]. 
In his 1997 Order Judge Sims adopted the findings of the Medical Panel which became the 
controlling medical evidence in this case. I in turn adopted Judge Sims findings in my January 2, 
2002 Order. 
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My January 2, 2002 Order also recounted the respondents responsibility for the infections and six 
surgical procedures endured by Mr. DeMille related to his dorsal column stimulator. On April 
28, 1998 Dr. Home operated on Mr. DeMille and inserted a: "thoracic spine dorsal epidural 
dorsal column stimulator." [id. Vol. I. at 6]. The stimulator became infected and Mr. DeMille 
endured a ten month course of hospitalizations and six surgical interventions, [id. Vol. I. at 12, 
24, 29, 30, 39, and 94; Vol. II at 204, 206, and 268]. On February 19, 1999 Dr. Home removed 
the stimulator, [id. Vol. I at 74]. Dr. Home adamantly proclaimed that: 
NONE OF THIS INFECTION WOULD HAVE OCCURRED HAD NOT THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY7 INSISTED ON A TWO STAGE PROCEDURE, 
WHICH ALLOWED AN INFECTION TO BE INTRODUCED INTO THE LEFT 
FLANK WHICH SIMMERED AND FINALLY RAISED IT'S HEAD AND 
BECAME A REAL INFECTION AND CELLULITIS LAST WEEK. [id. Vol. II 
at 332]. 
Following the infections associated with the spinal cord stimulator, his treating physicians 
rendered a series of opinions concerning Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability caused by the 
September 14, 1995 industrial injury. On June 21, 1999 Dr. Home stated: 
My opinion is he may very likely be as good as he's going to get. 
He's certainly disabled and can do very little if anything. He can hardly sit in a 
car for a few minutes, can't sit up around the house for longer than Yi hour or an 
hour without laying back down. He's not capable of any type of gainful 
employment and I see no light at the end of the tunnel that's going to change this. 
[id. Vol II at 346i][emphasis added]. 
On November 8, 2000 Dr. Home stated: 
S.S. has determined that he is totally disabled with which I agree. ri nere is no way 
that he could sit/walk/be driven to a job or functionally be able to perform even a 
sedentary job for a predictable time of even forty hours. Any of this would 
aggravate his condition, [id. Vol. II at 359-360]. 
7
 Respondent Freemont Comp. 
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On March 29, 2001 Dr. Home opined that: 
The patient absolutely is not going to improve. He may become and probably will 
become progressively more severe, [id. Vol. II at 360B]. 
He is totally disabled, is unable to sit, stand, walk for more than just a few 
minutes at a time, and has significantly increases of pain in performing those 
small intervals of activity. He uses a cane even to move around the home...At the 
very most, he's able to walk with a cane 2-3 blocks in extreme circumstances...In 
extreme circumstances, he can stand for 20-30 minutes, or sit for 45 to 90 minutes 
such as on some car rides or even going to a doctor's office, [id. Vol. II at 
3 60C] [emphasis added] 
On April 24, 2001 Dr. Jerold Hagen M.D. opined regarding Mr. DeMille: 
He has been unable to work or engage in any activity. He cannot sit for any length 
of time nor can he walk for any distance. 
[M]r. DeMille is a patient who's life has been totally changed since 1998 and has 
been unable to work or perform any meaningful activity....// is doubtful to me that 
the patient will ever be able to hold down a meaningful job unless some resolution 
can be found for his incessant pain. [id. Vol. Ill at 456] [emphasis added]. 
Both Dr. Home and Dr. Hagen professed that Mr. DeMille was totally disabled with little hope 
for improvement. The controlling findings of the June 19,1997 Labor Commission Medical 
Panel determined that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted a 
"significant injury," and "produced a significant aggravation" of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low 
back problems, [id. Vol. II at 440]. The Labor Commission Medical Panel also concluded that 
but for Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, he "likely (would) have continued 
relatively asymptomatic for an indefinite period." [id.]. 
Dr. Home maintained that decisions made by respondents concerning Mr. DeMille's dorsal 
column stimulator resulted in his ten month course of hospitalizations, six surgical interventions, 
and much of the current problems suffered by Mr. DeMille. [id. Vol. II at 332]. Dr. Hagen 
opined that inter alia the resultant complications caused by the infections from dorsal column 
stimulator eventually led to Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability. 
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In summary, the established facts in this case revealed that between 1987, and September 14, 
1995, Mr. DeMille remained relatively asymptomatic and able to work. The determinative facts 
of this case confirmed that but for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, he 
likely would have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period. 
The established facts of this case verified that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial 
accident itself constituted a significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. 
DeMille's preexisting low back problems. Further, the conclusive evidence in this case disclosed 
that the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in serious, permanent 
exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems. While not given a percentage impairment rating, 
Mr. DeMille's low back problems caused by the September 14,1995 industrial accident took him 
from employ ability with a preexisting 17% whole person impairment to permanent total 
disability. Therefore, Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injuries caused a significant 
impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (l)(b)(i) (1995), 
2. Permanent Total Disability. 
a. Gainful Employment. 
Sometime after the September 14,1995 industrial accident, Mr. DeMille worked for three 
months as a sales clerk at Hurst Sporting Goods (Hurst). Mr. DeMille terminated his 
employment with Hurst because of back pain. 
After the September 14,1995 industrial accident, Mr. DeMille also worked for six months with 
Danny Bundy Construction Company (Danny Bundy). Again, Mr. DeMille stopped working 
with Danny Bundy because of his back problems. Mr. DeMille held no gainful employment 
since his job with Danny Bundy. At the time of the hearing on May 13, 2002, Mr. DeMille 
remained unemployed. 
b. Ability to do Basic Work Activities. 
As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
c. Ability to Perform Essential Functions of Work Activities for 
which Kirk DeMille Qualified prior to September 14,1995. 
As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that 
Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 injuries caused him to become unable to do any type of work 
activities. 
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d. Other Work Reasonably Available. 
As set forth in Section IV.F.l. infra, the established medical evidence in this case confirmed that 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
e. Conclusion. 
As set forth in Section IV.F. 1. infra, the established-medical evidence in this case contirmed Mr. 
DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in Mr. 
DeMille's medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting 
injuries that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled. 
3. Direct Cause of Kirk DeMille's Permanent Total Disability. 
As cited multiple times herein, the opinion of the 1997 Labor Commission Medical Panel 
constituted the conclusive medical opinion as adopted by Judge Sims' 1997 Order and my own 
January 2, 2002 Order. The 1997 Labor Commission Medical panel determined that but for Mr. 
DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, he likely would have continued relatively 
asymptomatic and employable for an indefinite period, [id. Vol. II at 440]. The established facts 
of this case verified that Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted 
a significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low 
back problems, [id.]. Further, the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care 
resulted in serious exacerbations of the problems caused by the September 14,1995 industrial 
accident, [id. Vol. II at 332, and Vol. HI. at 456]. In sum, the determinative medical evidence in 
this case established that Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 industrial accident, and the 
respondents medaling in his medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations 
to preexisting problems that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled, 
4. Date of Commencement of Permanent Total Disability. 
Mr. DeMille worked for nine months after his September 14, 1995 industrial accident, [see: 
Section IV.F.2.a.]. Thereafter, Mr. DeMille remained unemployed, and permanently, totally 
disabled. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence in this case established the 
commencement date of Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability at June 15,1996. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Prior Orders. 
To the extent that they are compatible with the present Order, I hereby adopt the conclusions of 
law set forth in the 1997 Order, and the January 2, 2002 Order. 
B. Employment 
Thurston employed Mr. DeMille on September 14, 1995. 
C. Compensation Rate. 
On September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille was married with three dependent children. Further, on 
September 15, 1995 Mr. DeMille's compensation with Thurston equaled $12.00 per hour, 40 
hours per week, for an average weekly wage of $480.00 per week. Mr. DeMille's wages 
established $335.00 per week as the appropriate permanent total disability compensation rate for 
the September 14, 1995 injury. 
D. Prior Low Back Injuries. 
Mr. DeMille suffered a 17% whole person impairment from low back injuries prior to the 
September 14,1995 industrial accident. 
E. The September 14,1995 Industrial Injury. 
On September 14, 1995 Mr. DeMille injured his low back and left leg when he fell off a front-
end loader. Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment with Thurston. 
The 1995 industrial accident caused Mr. DeMille serious back problems. Mr. DeMille suffered 
ongoing low back pain and left leg radiculopathy due to permanent aggravations caused by the 
1995 accident. Mr. DeMille also suffered some spinal, soft tissue damage from infections 
accompanying the stimulator implant. Freemont Comp's requirement of a two stage procedure 
for the stimulator implant caused Mr. DeMille's spinal infections that accompanied the 
stimulator.8 
As stated by professor Larson: "It is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary 
injury by medical or surgical treatment is compensable." A. LARSON and L. LARSON, LARSON'S 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 10.09 [1] (2002). See also: Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial 
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F. Permanent Total Disability. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (1) (1995) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or 
occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section: 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
(i) The employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease 
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) The employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of 
the employees permanent total disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude 
that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that 
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions 
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis of 
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available taking 
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience,, 
medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Comm'n. 73 Utah 535,275 P. 777 (1929). 
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1. Significant Impairment Caused by the September 14,1995 Industrial 
Accident 
Between 1987, and September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMille's preexisting low back problems remained 
relatively asymptomatic and he was able to work. But for Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 
industrial accident, he likely would have continued relatively asymptomatic and employable for 
an indefinite period. Mr. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident itself constituted a 
significant injury, and produced a substantial aggravation of Mr. DeMille's preexisting low back 
problems. Further, the respondents' interference in Mr. DeMille's medical care resulted in 
serious, permanent exacerbations to Mr. DeMille's back problems. 
While not given a percentage impairment rating, Mr. DeMille's low back problems caused by the 
September 14, 1995 industrial accident took him from employability with a preexisting 17% 
whole person impairment to permanent total disability. Therefore, Mr. DeMille's September 14, 
1995 injuries caused a significant impairment within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(l)(b)(i)(1995).9 
2. Permanent Total Disability. 
a. Gainful Employment. 
At the time of the hearing on May 13, 2002, Mr. DeMille remained unemployed. 
b. Ability to do Basic Work Activities. 
Mr. DeMille remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
c. Ability to Perform Essential Functions of Work Activities for 
which Kirk DeMille Qualified prior to September 14,1995. 
Mr. DeMille's September 14,1995 injuries caused him to become unable to do any type of work 
activities. 
9
 Respondents' argument that a finding of "significant impairment" requires a rated 
impairment would lead to the unnecessary exercise of obtaining impairment ratings for all 
injuries causing permanent total disability regardless of the seriousness or nature of the injury. 
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d. Other Work Reasonably Available. 
Mr. ueivnne remained unable to do any type of work activities. 
e < " ii11' ill in, "III in i in "in in in. 
Mr. DeMille's September it, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in Mr. 
DeMille's medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting 
injuries that left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled. 
3. Direct Cause of Kirk DeMille's Permanent Total Disability. 
Mi. DeMille's September 14, 1995 industrial accident, and the respondents medaling in his 
medical care for same, caused significant injuries and aggravations to preexisting injuries that 
left Mr. DeMille permanently and totally disabled. 
I. Date of Commencement of Permanent Total Disability. 
The commencement date of Mr. DeMille's permanent total disability is June 15, 1996. 
VI. ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or 
Freemont Comp. shall pay Kirk DeMille subsistence payments in the amount of $335.00 per 
week as of the date of this order and ongoing until further order of the Labor Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (6)(b) (1995). Further benefits to be determined after 
accomplishment of the procedures set forth in Utah Code Ann §35-1-67 (6)(a). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or 
Freemont Comp. shall pay all medical expenses reasonably related to Kirk DeMille's back 
injuries incurred on September 14, 1995, according to the medical and surgical fee schedule of 
the Utah Labor Commission. The respondents Thurston Cable Construction and/or Freemont 
Comp. shall also pay travel allowances plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the respondents intend to submit a reemployment plan, the 
respondents shall file notice of such intent within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. The 
respondents shall file the reemployment plan within thirty (30) days after filing the notice of 
intent to file the plan, or within (60) days of the date of this order. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by separate notice hearing shall be set with respect to any 
reemployment plan submitted by respondents. 
Dated this 6th day of November 2002, 
chard M. La Jeunesse 
dministrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the 
foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
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Order Denying Motion tor Review/Order of Remand 
Utah Labor Commissioner R. Lee Eliertson 
May 30, 2003 
AH LABOR COMMISSION 
KIRK S. DEMILLE, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
* . 
v- * ORDER OF REMAND 
THURSTON CABLE CONSTRUCTION 
and FREEMONT COMP-, * 
* Case No. 00-1059 
Defendants. * 
All parties ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's 
decision regarding Kirk S. Demille's claim for permanent total disability compensation benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.) 
I he Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
On September 14,1995, Mr. DeMille was injured in an accident while working for Thurston 
Cable. He now seeks permanent total disability compensation from Thurston Cable and its workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, Freemont Comp. (referred to jointly as "Thurston" hereafter). After 
an evidentiary hearing, Judge La Jeunesse concluded Mr. DeMille was entitled to a preliminary 
finding of permanent total disability, subject to further proceedings to determine whether he can be 
reemployed or rehabilitated. Judge LaJeunesse ordered Thurston to begin paying subsistence 
benefits to Mr. DeMille as of November 6, 2002, the date of Judge La Jeunesse's decision. 
Thurston requests Commission review of Judge LaJeunesse's decision on the grounds that: 
i J Mi. DeMille did not sustain a "significant impairment" from his accident at Thurston; and, 2) the 
accident was not the direct cause of his permanent total disability. For his part, Mr. DeMille asks 
the Commission to review the date on which subsistence benefits should commence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in Judge La Jeunesse's decision. As 
material to the issues raised by the parties' motions for review, the facts are summarized below. 
At the time Mr. DeMille began working for Thurston, he had a 17% whole person 
impairment from prior back injuries. Nevertheless, he was able to perform his work duties at 
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Thurston and remain gainfully employed. Then, on September 14, 1995, Mr. DeMille tell ott a 
front-end loader at Thurston. This accident significantly aggravated his preexisting back problems. 
He underwent back surgeries to treat his injuries, but developed a serious infection as a complication 
of the surgeries. The infection required even more medical care and, eventually, more surgery. All 
told, Mr. DeMille spent ten months in the hospital and had a total of six surgeries. As a result of 
all this, Mr. DeMille now has scarring in his spine, muscle and soft tissue of his back. Mr. DeMille 
is unable to sit, stand, or walk for more than a few minutes at a time. He cannot work or engage in 
any significant physical activity. His condition will not improve and will probably deteriorate. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
There is no question that Mr. DeMille injured his back in a work-related accident at Thurston 
on September 14, 1995. Consequently, his injuries are compensable under the Utah workers' 
compensation system. See §34A-2-401 of the Act. However, in order to receive the specific benefit 
of permanent total disability compensation, Mr. DeMille must satisfy the conditions set forth in 
§34A-2-413 of the Act. Thurston argues that Mr. DeMille has failed to meet two of those 
conditions. 
First, Thurston contends that Mr. DeMille has not met §34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)'s requirement 
of a "significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident. 
. . that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement.)" Section 34A-2-102(8) defines 
"impairment" as "a purely medical condition reflecting any anatomical or function abnormality or 
loss." Mr. DeMille's accident at Thurston on September 14, 1005, and the medical treatment he 
received as a result of the accident, produced scarring in muscle, spine and soft tissue, resulting in 
both anatomical and functional abnormality and loss. Thus, the record establishes that Mr. DeMille 
sustained an "impairment" within the meaning of the Act as a result of his accident at Thurston. 
The Commission notes Thurston's argument that Mr. DeMille's impairment cannot be 
considered significant because it has never been rated by a physician. While such a rating would 
have been helpful in this case, and might be essential in other cases, §34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) only 
requires a "significant impairment," not a "significant impairment rating." In light of the facts and 
medical opinion submitted in this case, the Commission agrees with Judge LaJeunesse that Mr. 
DeMille has established a significant impairment. 
Thurston's second argument is that Mr. DeMille tailed to meet §34A-2-413(l)(b)(iii)'s 
requirement that "the industrial accident... was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
disability." In considering this argument, the Commission notes Mr. DeMille was able to work prior 
to his accident at Thurston, but after the accident the resulting injuries and consequences of medical 
treatment left him unable to work, except for relatively short and unsuccessful efforts to rejoin the 
workforce. Mr. DeMille's inability to work as a result of the Thurston accident is confirmed by the 
medical evidence. Thus, Mr. DeMille's accident at Thurston is the direct cause of his permanent 
00223 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR REVIEW/REMAND 
KIRK S. DEMILLE 
PAGE 3 
total disability. 
Although Thurston cites the Utah Court of Appeals' recent decision in McKesson v. 
Lieberrnan, 41 P3d 468 (Utah App. 2002) to support its argument, McKesson involved a non-work 
aggravation of a work-related injury. The Court of Appeals' analysis of that situation is not 
applicable to a case such as this, where there have been two separate work accidents, the last of 
which removes the worker from the workforce. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr. DeMille has satisfied the 
requirements of §34A-2-413(l)(b), including subparts (i) and (iii). He is therefore entitled to a 
tentative determination of permanent total disability 
The Commission now turns to Mr. DeMille's contention that he should receive retroactive 
subsistence benefits. As pointed out by Thurston, the Commission has addressed this issue before. 
The Commission has consistently held that, because the Act itself does not specify when the 
subsistence payments should begin, that question must be decided on a case by case basis by the 
ALJ, subject to review by the Commission or Appeals Board. In this case, the Commission finds 
no basis to disturb Judge LaJeunesse's order that Thurston begin payment of subsistence benefits 
to Mr DeMille as of November 6,2002. 
Finally, Mr. DeMille contends that Judge LaJeunesse neglected to provide tor payment ot 
attorneys fees to Mr. DeMille's counsel. Because the Commission remands this matter to Judge 
LaJeunesse for additional proceedings, the Commission instructs Judge LaJeunesse to consider and 
rule upon this question of attorneys fees. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge LaJeunesse's decision in this matter and denies the motions 
for review of Thurston and Mr. DeMille. The Commission remands this matter to Judge LaJeunesse 
to complete the adjudication of Mr. DeMille's claim for permanent total disability compensation and 
also to rule upon the issue of attorneys fees for Mr. DeMille's counsel. It is so ordered. 
Dated this jffiday of May, 2003. 
R. Lee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
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